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Abstract. Economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations on the
basis of veriﬁable events. As a matter of law, this is not the case. This leaves open the question
of optimal contract design given the available remedies that are enforced by a court of law. This
paper shows that standard form construction contracts can be viewed as an optimal solution to this
problem. It is shown that a central feature of construction contracts is the inclusion of governance
covenants that shape the scope of authority, and regulate the ex post bargaining power of parties.
Our model also provides a uniﬁed framework for the study of the legal remedies of mistake, impos-
sibility and the doctrine limiting damages for unforeseen events developed in the case of Hadley vs.
Baxendale.
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And other things of this sort should be known to architects, so that, before they begin upon
buildings, they may be careful not to leave disputed points for the householders to settle after the
works are ﬁnished, and so that in drawing up contracts the interests of both employer and contractor
may be wisely safe-guarded. For if a contract is skillfully drawn, each may obtain a release from
the other without disadvantage.
Vitruvius, Ten Books on Architecture , Chapter 1, Book 1, circa 1st Century B.C.
1. Introduction
Economic models of contract typically assume that courts enforce obligations that are a function
of veriﬁable events. Yet, as ﬁrst year students of contract law know, there are many examples of
cases where the courts do not enforce well deﬁned contractual obligations. This leads naturally to
the question of how legal constraints aﬀect the form and structure of observed contracts.1 In this
paper we show that the American Institute of Architects (AIA) form construction contracts can
be viewed as an eﬃcient solution to the problem of completing a large, complex building project
at the lowest cost given current legal institutions. This question is of intrinsic economic interest
because these form contracts are responsible for regulating billions of dollars of resources in the
United States. Moreover, many of the features of the AIA form contracts are also found in form
construction contracts used worldwide.2 Second, we show that eﬃciency is achieved with a contract
that uses available legal instruments to appropriately allocate bargaining power between the buyer
and the seller. Finally, we use our model to provide a general rule for optimal contract damages
that includes expectation damages and the doctrines of mistake and impossibility as special cases.
It is well known that contracts for complex projects, such as construction, are necessarily incom-
plete because it is impossible to specify in detail performance for all possible contingencies.3 The
early literature on incomplete contracts, including Rogerson (1984), Grout (1984), Hart and Moore
(1988) and Tirole (1986), has shown that the need to renegotiate an incomplete contract can make
it impossible to provide incentives for eﬃcient relationship speciﬁc investment.4 A key feature of
these models is the assumption that the bargaining power of parties is exogenous during ex post
1Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) describe the role played by the law in constraining negotiation. In their case, they
focus upon divorce agreements.
2See Odams (1995) for a collection of papers that compare building contracts in various jurisdictions.
3Williamson (1975) explicitly makes this point. He discusses informally the problems that arise due to opportunistic
behavior when there is idiosyncratic exchange between a buyer and seller.
4See Che and Hausch (1999) for a general formulation of this result.
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renegotiation, while the contract determines the default payoﬀs of parties, should renegotiation be
unsuccessful.
However, there are many ways that parties may use contracts to manipulate the default payoﬀs
to achieve eﬃcient trade. MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) consider the case in which risk neutral
parties, at some cost, are able to buy or sell the goods they are trading on an open market. When
the market acts as an outside option in the sense of Shaked and Sutton (1984), then this ensures
that parties cannot receive payoﬀs that are worth less than their market values. More importantly,
it also ensures that the parties cannot use the outside option as a threat to obtain more than their
market valuation. MacLeod and Malcomson (1993) show this implies that prices are rigid and
renegotiated if and only if an outside option is binding, and that in turn ensures eﬃcient incentives
for relationship speciﬁc investment in a variety of trading situations.
In the case of risk averse buyers and sellers Chung (1991) and Aghion et al. (1994) have shown
that if the courts use the legal remedy of speciﬁc performance for breach of contract, then it is
possible to design a contract that achieves the ﬁrst best. By speciﬁc performance one means that
the courts assess damages to any party who breaches that are larger than any possible gain from
contract breach. This ensures that no party would ever voluntarily choose to breach an agreement.
As a matter of law the courts do not routinely use speciﬁc performance when adjudicating a
commercial contract. A good example is the famous case of Jacob & Youngs Inc. v. George E.
Kent.5 In this case Kent hired Jacob & Youngs to build a house, and in the building contract
speciﬁed the brand of wrought iron water pipe to be used (Reading Co.). After the pipe had been
installed and encased in the walls Kent learned that some of the pipe was of a diﬀerent brand, and
he then refused to make the ﬁnal payment of $3,483.46 to Jacob & Youngs. The contractor Jacob
& Youngs sued Kent for the ﬁnal amount owed.
At the trial, Jacob & Youngs were barred from submitting evidence that the pipe installed was
equivalent in quality to the one in the contract. In fact, Kent's architect was on site as the pipe was
being installed, and did not notice the substitution. Hence, the substitution was not an opportunistic
action by the contractor to reduce costs, but rather an error that had little impact upon the ﬁnal
quality of the house. The trial judge ruled against Jacob & Youngs, saying that he had clearly not
performed as speciﬁed in the contract, and therefore Kent was under no obligation to make the ﬁnal
payment until Jacob & Youngs installed the pipes as required in the contract.
5Jacob & Youngs Inc. v. George E. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, N.Y., 1921.
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Jacob & Youngs appealed the decision based upon the fact that they were barred from submitting
evidence regarding the quality of the installed pipe. The appellate court overruled the trial court
decision, with Judge Cardozo writing the majority decision. He argued that the lower courts were
in error, and that since the diﬀerence between the actual performance and that required in the
contract is trivially small, the seller is deemed to have performed, and Kent has an obligation to
make the ﬁnal payment. In this case the courts are applying the remedy of expectation damages,
namely a measure of the loss arising from the breach of contract.6 In this case the loss in value was
so small, that the courts ordered Kent to make the ﬁnal payment required under the contract.
At the time, the decision was very controversial because the contract speciﬁed that Kent would
not have to make the ﬁnal payment until the project was completed as speciﬁed in the plans for the
house. In the view of Judge McLaughlin, who wrote the dissenting opinion, this rule would in the
future undermine the ability of individuals to write binding agreements, a viewed echoed in the work
of modern legal scholars, such as Alan Schwartz (1979). Whether or not one agrees with the courts,
this ruling implies that economic models of contract that rely upon the enforcement of speciﬁc
performance by the courts cannot explain observed contracts. Parties with rational expectations
regarding the behavior of the courts should design contracts taking into account how the courts
actually behave, and not how they should or might behave.
Inattention to the role of the law may partially explain why, as Maskin and Tirole (1999) have
observed, there is a distance between the predictions of contract theory and observed contract forms.
In this paper, we introduce a model of the procurement process that explicitly takes as given that
the standard common law remedy for contract breach is expectation damages - a court determined
measure of the loss suﬀered by the plaintiﬀ. We shall show that the optimal procurement contract,
given this legal constraint, is not only consistent with the main features of the AIA form contracts,
but can implement the project at the lowest, feasible, ex ante cost.
The agenda of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce a model of complex procurement
that builds upon Bajari and Tadelis (2001)'s insight that one can endogenize contract completeness
by supposing that planning for the future is a relationship speciﬁc investment.7 We suppose that
6This deﬁnition is unfortunately vague. In practice, the determination of expectations damages is quite complex, and
can entail the hiring of expert witnesses, such as economists, to create measures of lost value. See Fuller, L. L. and
Perdue, William R., Jr. (1936) for a classic discussion of the issue. In the context of the model, the concept is well
deﬁned in terms of the monetized value of utility loss when there is breach.
7Important early models include Tirole (1986) and Hart and Moore (1988).
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the preferences of the buyer are observed by neither the seller nor the courts. Incomplete planning
is modeled as a shock to buyer preferences during contract execution, that in turn require the
renegotiation of the project's design. In addition, we allow for relationship speciﬁc investment by
the seller into cost reduction, and show that there is a trade-oﬀ between the cost of production and
allowing for ex post ﬂexibility in design. Finally, we characterize the eﬃcient allocation.
The problem of implementing the eﬃcient allocation in the shadow of the law is addressed in
section 3. We show that the eﬃcient contract is constructed from a set of contractual instruments.8
These correspond to speciﬁc terms in the form construction contracts sold by the American Institute
of Architects (AIA), each of which is legally binding and enforceable in US courts. Together these
instruments ensure the project is completed at the lowest cost. The AIA published the ﬁrst set
of form contracts in 1888, and since then has continually improved these contracts in the light of
both technical developments in the construction industry, and legal developments arising from court
decisions involving construction disputes.9
The study of these contracts provides two useful lessons. First, these forms have systematically
been modiﬁed in the light of experience with adjudication, hence they are examples of contracts that
are enforceable under U.S. law. Second, they are relatively complete, in the sense that they explicitly
provide for a process of adjudication should there be a dispute, regardless of the circumstances.
Early work on incomplete contracts, beginning with Williamson (1975) and later Anderlini and
Felli (1994), observes that it is not possible to write a complete contract due to the sheer number
of possible future contingencies. MacLeod (2002) explores the role that norms and informal en-
forcement can play in regulating incomplete contracts in this case. However, informal enforcement
cannot regulate disputes that involve high stakes. The solution that the AIA has discovered relies
upon carefully allocating authority over ex post modiﬁcations to the buyer or the seller that depend
upon the nature of the task in question.10 This can be done in a way that greatly reduces the
number of situations in which the courts may be asked to intervene.
This practice is consistent with recent theoretical developments by Chung (1991) and Aghion
et al. (1994). They demonstrate that the appropriate allocation of authority at the ﬁnal stage of
8The concept of a contractual instrument is developed in the on going work of W. B. MacLeod and L. Kornhauser.
9The AIA publishes compendiums of courts cases, along with a discussion of their implications for contract adjudi-
cation (see Stein (2001)).
10There are several form contracts. The main contract or keystone contract is form A201-1997 that deals with the
regulation of the relationship during construction. Below we discuss some of the other forms.
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a relationship can ensure the implementation of an eﬃcient allocation. Using the AIA contracts
as a guide, we extend this result to more general model of Bajari and Tadelis (2001) to show that
the eﬃcient project is implemented by a contract that carefully structures control rights ex ante,
before the contract is signed, at the interim stage, while production is in progress, and at the ﬁnal,
ex post stage. In section 3 we derive this contract, and show how each contractual instrument in
the complete contract relates to speciﬁc features of the AIA form contracts.
In practice, parties are free to write any contract they wish. Given the complexity of writing
an optimal contract, this implies that many contracts are poorly drafted and not enforceable as
written. In these cases, the courts may be asked to intervene and to supply the terms missing from
the agreement. Beginning with Goetz and Scott (1977), the modern view on legal default rules is
that courts should use defaults that would be part of an optimal contract had the parties received
the appropriate advice during contract formation. This is consistent with Posner (2003)'s view that
one can understand the evolution of law as evolving rules that provide an eﬃcient solution to the
cases brought before the courts.
Section 4 discusses the implications of our results for the structure of legal defaults. We show that
the decision in the controversial case of Jacob & Youngs v. Kent is consistent with optimal contract
design. We also discuss the famous case of Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Co.11, where Garland Coal
breached its obligation to grade a farmer's land at the cessation of operations for a strip mine.
In this case, the courts awarded the Peevyhouses the diminution in value to the land ($300)
resulting from leaving the land ungraded compared to having the land graded. Under a rule of
speciﬁc performance, the courts would have awarded the cost of grading ($29,000). Observe that
grading land is an engineering project, and hence is covered by forms that are similar to the AIA
forms.12 Here we discuss how the AIA form contracts could have been used to achieve performance
in this case. This case illustrates the point that parties do in practice may write contracts that are
neither eﬃcient nor enforceable.
The implications of our analysis, and the contributions to the literature are discussed in the ﬁnal
section of the paper. We conclude by observing that our results are consistent with the hypothesis
that the American Institute of Architects form construction contracts have evolved over the last
11Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109, 114 (Okla.1962)
12The National Society of Professional Engineers also sell their own form contracts, similar in structure to the AIA
forms, but tailored to the needs of engineering projects such as roads and bridges. The provision we cite in the AIA
forms would also be present in these contracts.
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hundred years to provide an eﬃcient solution to the problem of procuring a complex good, such as
large a building.
2. A Model of Procurement
This section introduces a model of procurement that captures several of the salient features
of complex real world procurement. When complete contracts are possible and enforceable then
contract theory has little to say regarding the form of observed contracts. This is because many
diﬀerent contract forms can implement the same eﬃcient allocation. For example, suppose a seller
agrees to supply a good at a price P . If all contracts can be enforced then one may pay an amount
P1 in advance, and P2 upon delivery. The distribution of payments is indeterminate and all one can
say is that P1 + P2 = P .
This simple example illustrates the important point that the economic theory alone cannot explain
all of the observed features of a contract. In order to have a theory with some empirical bite, one
needs to introduce some speciﬁc market imperfections, and then show how the theory restricts
the set of observed contract forms in these cases. Our model has a number of speciﬁc market
imperfections that have been identiﬁed as important in the procurement process. In this section we
derive the optimal allocation taking these imperfections as given.
We have selected the smallest set of market imperfections or transaction costs that are suﬃcient
to explain the main features of the AIA form contracts. Each of these costs have been studied
in the contract theory literature, but for the most part in isolation from other transaction costs.
Together these transaction costs can help explain the design of the AIA form contracts - why they
are built up from a set of contractual instruments, and how each instrument is designed to achieve
very speciﬁc allocative goals.
More precisely, our model supposes that both the buyer and the potential sellers are risk neutral.
The project is assumed to require signiﬁcant relationship speciﬁc investment by both parties, and
therefore a contract is required to protect and promote these investments.13 The details of the
economic environment are as follows:
13See Klein et al. (1978) for a discussion of why contracts are needed in the presence of relationship speciﬁc investment.
See also Hart and Moore (1988).
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(1) The preference ordering of the buyer over project characteristics is private information.
Hence, the buyer must be induced to voluntarily reveal her most preferred project given the
cost.
(2) Investment into planning by the buyer is assumed to be observable by the potential sellers,
but not contractible. Bajari and Tadelis (2001) observe that project design provides a
concrete example of a relationship speciﬁc investment that is observable by both parties ex
post, but cannot be explicitly contracted upon (Grossman and Hart (1986)). It is well known
in the construction industry that contractors use information on the quality of project design
when setting their bids.14
(3) Following Laﬀont and Tirole (1986) it is assumed that the ex post cost of production is
observed, but not the ex ante investment by the seller into cost reduction.
(4) The project is complex, in the sense that it is built up from a set of components, such as the
foundations of a building, the window frames, the roof, electrical system and so on. This
complexity implies the design is incomplete in two dimensions. First, it may be necessary
to change the speciﬁcations of a component ex post. Second, the buyer may wish to add
components or elements to the project that were not anticipated at the time the contract
was signed.
Providing a precise deﬁnition of complexity is diﬃcult, and certainly controversial. Here we follow
the literature and use the notion of complexity in two senses. The ﬁrst notion is due to Bajari and
Tadelis (2001). Their insight is to recognize that investment in design aﬀects the probability that
the buyer will desire a change to the speciﬁcations of a project component. For example, one might
realize that a paint color does not look quite right once applied, and hence the buyer may request
a change. The key feature of the Bajari and Tadelis (2001) model is that the likelihood that the
design will be changed is anticipated by the seller, hence the seller can take these risks into account
when bidding for a project.
A project may also be complex because the buyer may require the addition of components to the
project that were unforeseen at the time of the design. For example, in the case of the Getty Museum
in Los Angeles, the Northridge earthquake occurred during construction. From this event the
builders learned that they had to make substantial changes to the structure. Given that earthquakes
14We thank George Lefcoe for pointing this out to us.
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are common to Los Angeles, this event was not unforeseen. The real issue is that it is costly to learn
the detailed consequences of such an event. In this case, what was unforeseen is the incompleteness
of their knowledge regarding the eﬀect of an earthquake upon the existing structure. The engineers
believed that their planning was adequate until the earthquake occurred. So, an event occurred that
resulted in further learning regarding the best plan. Accordingly, we explicitly model unforeseen
events as a form of learning regarding one's true preferences over project speciﬁcations.
Given that both the buyer and seller have made relationship speciﬁc investments, it is cheaper
to have the current seller carry out unforeseen modiﬁcations. However, due to the asymmetric
information that may exist between the buyer and seller, this may lead to ineﬃcient ex post rene-
gotiation. Ex ante there are such a large number of possible events that may require renegotiation
that it is not worthwhile to provide a contingency plan for each one of these events. This leads to
what MacLeod (2002) calls ex post holdup.
Ex ante hold-up, as modeled by Grout (1984) and Bajari and Tadelis (2001), arises from the fact
that the parties may share in the rents from decisions taken ex ante. In our model investments in
planning and cost reduction both face the hazard of ex ante holdup. In contrast, ex post holdup
arises from unexpected rents that are created ex post through any unexpected need to change the
speciﬁcations of the project ex post. Such an unexpected need creates ineﬃciencies when there is
private information regarding the value of the change. A contract can lower these costs through the
appropriate design of the contract renegotiation process.
The next section contains the formal description of the model. The procurement process is
divided into three major stages, ex ante, interim and ex post. The ex ante stage encompasses the
initial planning of the project and the selection of a suitable seller. The interim stage consists
of a sequence of actions by the seller to carry out the construction of the project, while the ex
post stage entails the ﬁnal settling up of payments, including possible litigation. Subsection 2.2
provides a characterization of the optimal allocation subject to the informational constraints of the
environment.
2.1. The Procurement Process.
Ex Ante Stage. This stage consists of two steps. First, the buyer invests in project design by hiring
an architect or engineer. Next, she designs a contract and procedure for selecting a seller from a set
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of potential sellers. In this section we describe the basic features of the project that are common
knowledge to both the buyer and the seller at the time a procurement contract is signed.
The project, whether it is a building, a bridge, or a weapons systems, is built from a set of
components, each of which have a well deﬁned speciﬁcation. Let T = {1, ..., N} denote the set
of possible components, where t is a typical component. This might be a type of door, along
with a speciﬁcation of the type of wood to be used and the ﬁnish. However, there is always some
uncertainty regarding design. For example, a building project might specify door handles, but fail
to specify the model or color.15
In other cases, the buyer may acquire information that leads her to change the speciﬁcation of
a project component after the contract is signed. For example, the design may call for a dividing
wall to be in a given location. Upon inspection of the ongoing work the buyer may realize this was
a mistake, and ask for a change. Or the cost of a particular material increases in an unexpected
manner. In that case the seller may request for the right to use a less expensive material.
Another example is the Getty Museum in Los Angeles that suﬀered a major earthquake during
construction. This unanticipated event resulted in major design changes, the cost of which were
born by the Getty Trust. Given that earthquakes are very common in Los Angeles, the event
itself was certainly foreseeable. It was the myriad consequences for the design of the building that
were unforeseen. This point illustrates that even with a well ﬁnanced project with good designers,
planning is likely to be incomplete.
Finally, the buyer may decide to add components to the project that were not foreseen at the
time the contract was signed. In principle, the new components could be viewed as a new project
requiring a new auction to select a potential supplier. However, given that the incumbent supplier
has already sunk costs into the construction process, it is likely more eﬃcient for him to build the
additional components. If so, then the use of an auction to set the price is likely to be ineﬃcient.
This is because the market price would include both the marginal costs of adding the components,
and the ﬁxed costs of bringing in a new supplier. For this reason, an eﬃcient contract should include
contractual instruments that regulate the price for any new component that is added to the project.
More formally, we suppose that the buyer and seller pay ﬁxed costs AB, ASi > 0 to implement
the project. For simplicity, the subsequent costs and beneﬁts from the project are assumed to be
15This example came from a discussion with a building contractor.
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additive by component. This allows considerable simpliﬁcation of the model. In this case contractual
instruments can be tailored to speciﬁc components or groups of components, and then simply added
on to the contract. Thus, without loss of generality, we suppose that the initial design consists of a
single component tC . This is the initial scope of the project. In addition, after the planning period,
the buyer may learn that she wishes to add an additional unforeseen component tU . Given that
this is taken from a potentially large set, there are no explicit contract terms for this component.
Rather, the contract speciﬁes a mechanism or renegotiation procedure that is to be followed for the
addition of such unforeseen contingencies.
Hence, the initial planning stage is concerned only with the foreseen component tC . Both parties
recognize that the speciﬁcations determining the characteristics of the component may change after
the fact. We denote the implemented foreseen component by q ∈ {0, 1} , where q = 1 denotes that
the component is executed as originally designed, while q = 0 denotes a change in the original
design. Changes in the design can occur as a result of shocks to the buyer's preferences or due to
the realized cost of implementation. These shocks are observed after the seller has made relation
speciﬁc investments, but before the project is implemented. The shock to buyer's preferences is
denoted by z ∈ {0, 1} , where z = 1 means the original design is preferred, while z = 0 implies that
the buyer would like to change the speciﬁcation of the component. The buyer's payoﬀ from this
component is u(q, z). The cost of implementing the speciﬁed design is detailed in the next section.
The likelihood of a design change ex post is a function of the buyer's investment into design,
given by d ≥ 0. The probability that z = 1 is given by ρ(d). It is assumed that in the absence of
any planning there is a 50% chance the buyer will change her mind (ρ(0) = 1/2), while an increased
investment into planning reduces the likelihood of a design change - formally, ρ′ > 0, ρ′′ < 0 and
limd→∞ρ(d) = 1. It is assumed that the sellers can observe d before a contract is signed.
In addition, at the time the contract is written, the buyer anticipates that she may wish to add
a component tu to the project, though both the nature and value of the component are unknown
ex ante.16 She will learn both the nature of the component and its utility, uu, during the period of
project implementation. The seller cannot observe uu. Let qu = 1 if an unforeseen component is
added to the project, and qu = 0 otherwise.
16One could put this into a more formal Bayesian framework with a large space of possible components, all having
equal ex ante probability of being added. When this space is suﬃciently large, there is no beneﬁt from adding
conditions for speciﬁc components. See MacLeod (2002) and Segal (1999) for formal models of this eﬀect.
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Potential sellers, upon observing d and the conditions of the procurement contract, make pro-
duction plans and bid for the right to carry out the project using the selection mechanism designed
by the buyer. Let ASi > 0 be each seller i's ﬁxed cost of production, i = 1, 2, .... This ﬁxed cost
is the only source of variation between sellers. Moreover, it is assumed that ex ante these costs
are independently distributed across sellers and unobserved to the buyer, and satisfy the regularity
condition of Myerson (1981). This ensures that a Vickrey auction with a reserve price is the eﬃcient
mechanism for choosing a seller.17
Interim Stage. During the interim stage the selected seller prepares for the execution of the project
by making investments into cost reduction. First the costs of production and the buyer's preferences
are realized. Then, if necessary, the project design is renegotiated, with the appropriate modiﬁca-
tions to the price using the procedures given by the contract. Finally, the project is completed.
The cost c of completing a foreseen component takes on one of two values: c ∈ {cL, cH}, where
cH > cL. The probability that the low cost, cL, is realized is determined by the seller's pre-
production eﬀort: e ≥ 0. This probability is given by ρ(e) ∈ (12 , 1). For simplicity this is the same
function as for the buyer's planning costs. This latter assumption saves on notation and can easily
be relaxed. Should the parties agree to have the design changed (q = 0) then the expected cost is
assumed to be cˆ = (cH + cL)/2. Let 4c = cH − cˆ = cˆ − cL parametrize the size of the potential
costs savings arising from the eﬀorts of the seller.
At the same time, the buyer realizes her preference shock z ∈ {0, 1}. In addition, the buyer
may realize a value, uu, and a cost, cu, for the unforeseen component that are independent of
other parameters of the model. Thus the state of the project just before it is realized is given by
ω = {z, c, uu, cu}. Recall that both z and uu are assumed to be unobserved by the seller and the
courts. If necessary, the contract terms are renegotiated, and the project Q = {q, qu} is realized.
Ex Post Stage. This is the ﬁnal settling up stage. In the absence of a pecuniary transfer the payoﬀs
to the buyer and seller given the state, ω, and the realized project, Q(ω), are:
UB(ω,Q, d, e) = u(q, z) + quuu − d−AB,
17See page 66, expression 5.1 of Myerson (1981). In addition to assuming the distribution of values are independent,
the regularity adds a monotonicity condition that ensures the existence of an eﬃcient solutions under a Vickrey
auction.
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USi (ω,Q, d, e) = −cˆ− q {c− cˆ} − qucu − e−ASi .
The contract terms, including any renegotiated price, determine the monetary transfer between
the buyer and the seller. In addition, if there has been a lawsuit then it may result in additional
payments between parties that are determined at this time. Let P denote the net transfer; then
the exchange concludes with the buyer and seller realizing their ﬁnal payoﬀs UB (ω,Q, d, e)−P and
USi (ω,Q, d, e) + P respectively.
2.2. The Eﬃcient Allocation. An eﬃcient allocation is a choice of seller, a set of investment
levels, and a design plan, denoted pi = {i, Q(ω), e, d}, where pi ∈ Π is the set of feasible allocations,
that maximize the social surplus:
E {Si (ω,Q(ω), d, e)} = E
{
UB (ω, d) + USi (ω, e)
}
.
Let us assume that the preferences of the buyer (z and uu) are observable. Given that there
are a ﬁnite number of potential sellers and that the probability function ρ(.) is continuous, it is
straightforward to show that an eﬃcient solution exists. The remainder of this section characterizes
this optimal solution as a function of model parameters and provides some comparative static results.
We also show how the eﬃcient project design Q∗(ω) can be implemented under the assumption that
the buyer's preferences are not observed.
Unforeseen Components. Consider ﬁrst the implementation of unforeseen components. Even though
both the buyer and the seller engage in planning, it is not possible to anticipate every need. An
unforeseen component is one for which neither the buyer nor the seller have done any planning.
Rather, during the interim stage the buyer learns that she would like to add an extra component
with value uu. Under the assumption that costs are observable, the buyer can ask the seller to
produce a binding estimate c for the cost of the component. It is eﬃcient to add this component to
the project (qu∗(ω) = 1) if and only if uu ≥ cu.
Foreseen Components. Consider now the design decision. Given the preference shock z, it is eﬃcient
to keep the original design if and only if :
(1) u(1, z)− u(0, z) ≥ c− cˆ.
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The cost diﬀerence satisﬁes c − cˆ = ±∆c depending upon whether the realized costs are either
high or low. Let ∆u0 = u(0, 0) − u(1, 0) > 0 and ∆u1 = u(1, 1) − u(0, 1) > 0 denote the gains to
the buyer from choosing the best design given her preference shock z. The analysis is signiﬁcantly
simpliﬁed if we suppose that the marginal gain from altering the design is independent of z and we
let:
∆u = ∆u1 = ∆u0 > 0.
The optimal design is now a function of the parameter β = {∆c,∆u} and is fully characterized by
two cases:
1. If ∆u ≥ ∆c, then the foreseen component is buyer biased and the optimal design satisﬁes:
q∗ (ω) =

1 if z = 1,
0 if z = 0.
2. If ∆u < ∆c then the foreseen component is seller biased and the optimal design satisﬁes:
q∗ (ω) =

1 if c = cL,
0 if c = cH .
Observe that a simple governance structure can ensure ex post eﬃciency, even in the presence of
asymmetric information. Suppose that the price does not vary with the choice of design. In that
case eﬃcient design can be implemented by giving the control right over the choice of q to the buyer
when a component is buyer biased, and to the seller when it is a seller biased component. This
mechanism ensures ex post eﬃciency, however, this does not necessarily lead to ex ante eﬃcient
investment. We now characterize the optimal investment into planning and cost reduction as a
function of the characteristics of the foreseen component.
Buyer Biased Foreseen Components. Under the assumption that the eﬃcient project is always im-
plemented, the social surplus from a buyer biased component (∆u ≥ ∆c) as a function of design d
and eﬀort e is:18
(2) SB(d, e) = u(0, 0)− cˆ+ (F (d) + 1) (u(1, 1)− u(0, 0) + F (e)∆c) /2− d− e.
18This is derived using the expected ex post gains from trade:
ρ(d) {ρ(e)(u11 − cL) + (1− ρ(e))(u11 − cH)}+ (1− ρ(d))(u00 − cˆ).
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where F (x) = (2ρ (x)− 1) is a measure of the foreseeability. When x = 0 then F (x) = 0, corre-
sponding to an unforeseeable outcome - z = 0 and z = 1 are equally likely. As x increases then
F (x) approaches 1, and which design will be eﬃcient is more predictable.
By assumption, the foreseeability function is strictly concave, and hence if it is eﬃcient to have
some planning the unique investment levels are uniquely characterized by:
F ′ (d∗) =
2
uu+ F (e∗) ∆c
,(3)
F ′ (e∗) =
2
(F (d∗) + 1)∆c
,(4)
where uu = u(1, 1)− u(0, 0) is the diﬀerence in utility at the two most preferred designs. Namely,
the diﬀerence between the utility when they prefer no design change, and this is implemented, and
if they wish a design change and this is implemented. Ex ante we might expect this diﬀerence to
be relatively small.
Notice that investment in planning and in cost reduction are complements - an increase in plan-
ning, d, increases the beneﬁt from investing in cost reduction and vice-verso. Let m = F ′(0) > 0 be
the marginal impact of planning upon foreseeability at zero investment.
Suppose that 2uu > m (planning gain is small enough), then, when the cost savings, ∆c, are
suﬃciently small it is eﬃcient to engage in no planning and make no eﬀort into cost reduction.
Conversely, for large enough cost savings, it is eﬃcient to plan, d∗, e∗ > 0. Finally, planning is
increasing in ∆c until ∆c = ∆u. These results are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Suppose ∆u ≥ ∆c and 2uu > m > 2∆c , then optimal cost reducing eﬀort, e∗, is
strictly positive, while optimal planning, d∗, is zero. Keeping the beneﬁt to planning, ∆u, ﬁxed,
increasing costs, ∆c, results in increased eﬀort e∗. Planning is strictly positive if and in only if
2
uu+F (e∗)∆c > m. In that case, an increase in ∆c leads to an increase in planning.
The condition that uu be small implies that ex ante there are a number of designs that are
acceptable. What is expensive is to have a divergence between the implement design, and the
desired design. This corresponds to a large value for ∆u relative to changes in costs, ∆c. An
increase in ∆c increases the beneﬁt from planning and cost reducing eﬀort, up to the point that
the eﬀect of costs overwhelm the consequence of a design change. When ∆c > ∆u, one is in a
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situation for which it is always eﬃcient to modify the design in the case of an adverse cost shock.
Components with this property are called seller biased components.
Seller Biased Components. For a seller biased (∆c > ∆u) component the eﬃcient design always
entails choosing the low cost option. In this case the expected ex post surplus is given by:
SS = (u(0, 0) + u(1, 1) + ∆c−∆u)/2− cˆ
+ F (e)∆c/2
F (e)∆c/2 + +F (d) (uu+ F (e)∆u) /2− d− e(5)
Hence, the ﬁrst order conditions for design and eﬀort are given by:
(6) F ′(d∗) =
2
uu+ F (e∗)∆u
(7) F ′(e∗) =
2
∆c+ F (d∗)∆u
As before, the ﬁrst order conditions uniquely determine design and eﬀort when they are positive.
Proposition 2. Suppose that component tC is seller biased (∆c > ∆u), 2uu > m >
2
∆c , and there is
no beneﬁt to planning (∆u = 0), then cost reducing eﬀort, e∗, is strictly positive, while planning, d∗,
is zero. As the beneﬁt to planning, ∆u, increases then the optimal investment into cost reduction
increases. If the marginal beneﬁt to planning is suﬃciently high ( 2uu+F (e∗)∆u > m) then this also
leads to an increase in planning.
As in the case of buyer biased components, investments into planning and cost reduction are
complementary. If the gain from cost reduction is suﬃciently small, then there is no beneﬁt from
planning at all.
Summary. An eﬃcient project is characterized by an optimal amount of planning into design that in
turn guides the investment into cost reduction by the seller. Components that are not in the original
plan are added later, though at a higher cost than if they had been included in the original plans,
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as seller eﬀort at reducing the cost of the foreseen component does not aﬀect the cost of producing
the unforeseen component. The amount of planning by the seller and the buyer depends upon the
extent of the potential cost savings. In general, investment into planning and cost reduction are
complements for both buyer biased and seller biased components. Given that the design for the
unforeseen component is not anticipated when the contract is signed it does not aﬀect the level of
relationship speciﬁc investment (see Hart (1990)).
3. Efficient Contractual Instruments
In this section we discuss the legal instruments that are supplied by the AIA form contracts that
implement the eﬃcient allocation, given the legal remedies that are supplied by US courts. The
ﬁrst stage entails the planning for the project, and the choice of the contractor. The second stage
entails the completion of the project, which may include changes to the original plan.
3.1. Ex Ante: Seller Choice. Contractors are typically selected by some form of sealed-bid
auction. Normally, the owner chooses the lowest bid, although they have the legal right to choose
any bidder they wish, and often they do not choose the lowest bid.19 The reason is that some sellers
may be either technically or ﬁnancially incapable of executing the project, and hence may make
unrealistically low bids. The problem is addressed by requiring bidders to pre-qualify. The bidding
then occurs among the qualiﬁed bidders.
The standard economic rationale for the use of a bidding procedure is to learn which seller
has the lowest cost of supplying the good (see McAfee and McMillan (1987)). In the context of
complex procurement, the use of an auction also plays an important role in providing the buyer with
the appropriate incentives to invest in design, and thereby solving a signiﬁcant source of holdup.
Any investment into design that leads to lower costs results, under the hypothesis that design is
observable, to lower bids by prospective sellers. This in turn provides the buyer with ﬁrst best
incentives to invest in design.
More formally, suppose that the buyer chooses a contract k ∈ K and design d. Given this
information sellers oﬀer to carry out the project for a base price P . In addition, the contract k has
clauses that allow additional transfers T to occur that are a function of events that occur as the
project is implemented. Let i ∈ S be a potential seller from a set of potential sellers, whose payoﬀs
19Universal By-Products Inc. v City of Modesto (1974), 43 CA3d 145). The city of Modesto was sued for not granting
the contract to the lowest bidder. The court ruled in favor of the city.
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are assumed to be given by:
USi (k, d, P ) = E
{
USi (ω,Q(ω, k), d, e
∗(k, d)) + T (ω,Q(ω, k), d, e∗(k, d))|k, d}+ P.
The buyer's payoﬀ is given by:
UB (k, d, P ) = E
{
UB (ω,Q(ω, k), d, e∗(k, d))− T (ω,Q(ω, k), d, e∗(k, d))|k, d}− P.
In both cases Q(ω, k) is the realized design chosen under the contract given the state ω, while e(k, d)
is the eﬀort chosen by the seller as a function of the contract and the quality of the design d. The
additional transfer required by the contract is denoted by T (ω,Q(ω, k), d, e∗(k, d)).
In this model, the only asymmetric information among the sellers is their privately observed ﬁxed
cost of doing the project. Under the regularity condition of Myerson (1981), a second price auction
ensures that the seller with the lowest cost is selected:
Proposition 3. If the buyer allocates the project to the winner of the second price auction then
P = −USi (k, d, P ) + δ,
where δ = ASi′ − ASi > 0 is the diﬀerence in the bids between the lowest and second lowest bid.
This is the lowest price the buyer can obtain conditional upon design d and contract k. Given this
equilibrium, the buyer chooses k, i and d to solve:
(8) maxk∈K,d≥0,i∈IE {Si (ω, d, e(k, d)) |k, d} .
These results follow from the observation that in the second price auction it is optimal for the
seller to bid a price P that makes him indiﬀerent between participation or not. Given that the only
variation among sellers is the ﬁxed cost of participation, and that the winning seller is paid the
second lowest price, then the winning seller receives his valuation USi plus the rent δ = A
S
i′ − ASi .
Given that the rent is independent of the contract oﬀered and the investment into design, and given
that for each contract oﬀered by the buyer, there exists a well deﬁned payoﬀ to the seller, the buyer
will choose the contract k ∈ K and design d that maximizes the social surplus, as given by (8).
Note that from the revenue equivalence theorem, as long as the ﬁxed costs ASi are independently
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distributed across sellers, then a ﬁrst price auction would also yield the same expected price and
payoﬀ.20
At this point we do not prove that a solution to (10) exists. We demonstrate this by construction
- we show that there is a contract that is built up from a number of contractual instruments that
corresponds to clauses in AIA form contracts, and that together these instruments implement the
ﬁrst best.
An essential ingredient for a successful auction is that once a winner has been selected, the winner
will in fact proceed to carry out the contract under the agreed upon terms. One problem is that
the winner now knows that he supplied the lowest bid, and might attempt to renegotiate the price
terms. In addition, once the project has begun, and there are substantial sunk investments, the
seller may try to holdup the buyer for better terms.
The AIA form contracts have a number of contractual instruments that explicitly address this
issue. Form A701 provides instructions to bidders. In order to deal with the threat of non-
performance, contractors are required to post bonds, as detailed in forms A310 and A312. Form
A310 is the bid bond that ensures that the winning seller does not renege upon their bid. Form
A312 contains two bonding provisions. There is a payment bond that ensures that subcontractors
are paid in the event that the contractor does not complete payment to them. This is necessary for
the owner because subcontractors can impose a mechanic's lien against the building if the contractor
fails to make a payment.21 The second part is a performance bond. This bond ensures that should
the contractor not complete the job, there are suﬃcient funds available to ﬁnd another contractor
who would be able to complete the work.22
Under form A312 the courts would never be asked to enforce performance per se. If a dispute
arises and there is stoppage of work by the contractor, the buyer would ask the bonding company
to provide the funds to complete the work. Should the bonding company refuse to pay, the buyer
would recover damages from the bonding company under the rule of expectation damages. Note
how the introduction of a bond eﬀectively ensures speciﬁc performance event though the courts
20See Myerson (1981).
21These liens are covered by state and local law, and provide a simple way for contractors to ensure that they are
paid for work completed. In practice, this usually means that, if the property is sold, the lien holders can make a
claim against purchase price before the original owner is paid.
22The ﬁrst clause of A312 states: The contractor and the Surety, jointly and severally, bind themselves, their heir,
executors, administrators, successors and assigns to the Owner for the performance of the Construction Contract,
which is incorporated herein by reference.
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limit damages to expectations. This is because the bond explicitly states that it will pay for work
should the original contract default, and hence the value of expectations is the cost of the work,
and not the value to the buyer.
Thus the bond eﬀectively releases the need for the courts to measure performance, but rather the
courts enforce (via expectation damages) a sequence of monetary transfers.
The AIA contracts also provide protection to the contractor from the buyer. Buyers are required
to make payments as work proceeds as a function of the contractor's costs. Hence, the amounts owed
to the contractor at any point in time are limited. In this way the contract is carefully structured
so that bargaining power can be reallocated between the parties as a function of who is in breach
of the contract.
3.2. Interim: Performance. In this section we discuss the contractual instruments that ensure
the eﬃcient implementation of the diﬀerent types of components in the project - those unforeseen at
time the contract is signed, seller biased foreseen components, and buyer biased foreseen components.
If the only goal were to ensure ex post eﬃciency then, as discussed in section 2, there are simple
governance structures that implement the eﬃcient design. The issue is more complex due to the
interaction between the unobserved investment into cost reduction by the seller and the unobserved
preferences of the buyer. For each type of component we show that there exists a contractual
instrument that implements the eﬃcient allocation. Moreover, each instrument has an analogue in
the AIA form contracts. This is consistent with the hypothesis that these forms are an eﬃcient
solution to the procurement problem in the shadow of the law.
3.2.1. Unforeseen Components. The procurement of a complex good, such as a large building, nec-
essarily entails adding components that were unforeseen at the time the plans were created. Given
that the incumbent seller is on site, he is likely to be the most eﬃcient supplier of the new com-
ponent. Hence, if the desired modiﬁcation leads to a signiﬁcant gain to the buyer, the seller may
attempt to extract a rent from the buyer during renegotiation. Given that the buyer's preferences
are not observed, this rent extraction may lead to a social loss.23
Costs are assumed to be observable, and hence eﬃciency can be achieved if the buyer has the
right to make changes as she wishes, with the only obligation being that she compensates the seller
for costs. This is precisely the solution suggested by article 7 of AIA form A201. Normally, changes
23Namely, modiﬁcations whose true costs are less than their value to the buyer might not be implemented.
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to a project are carried out via change orders, as speciﬁed by article 7.2 of A201-1997. A change
order consists of details of how the project is to be modiﬁed, and an agreement regarding the price.
Normally, the buyer has an architect acting on her behalf who is well versed in what are likely to
be reasonable costs. Moreover, by being a written document produced by design professionals it is
intended to provide a clear statement of the seller's obligation that, if necessary, can be veriﬁed by
a court.
This, combined with the requirement that the seller produces detailed accounts, implies that we
may suppose that the buyer is informed of the true cost of the change, and then decides whether or
not it should be implemented. Once the order has been issued, then it becomes a binding obligation
for the seller. More formally, the change order instrument is deﬁned as follows:
COI: Change Order Instrument:
(1) The buyer requests a new component, qu = 1.
(2) The seller reports the veriﬁable cost cu.
(3) The buyer then decides whether or not to proceed.
(4) If the buyer decides to proceed, the seller agrees to supply the component and the price
P is adjusted upwards by cu.
This contractual instrument corresponds to a cost plus contract under which the seller agrees to
carry out the requests of the buyer, and in return is reimbursed for out of pocket costs.
Proposition 4. The change order instrument results in the addition of a component with value uu
if and only if uu ≥ cu. Moreover, this instrument eﬃciently implements any foreseeable component
for which eﬀort is zero (e = 0.)
Observe that if there is no beneﬁt from planning, then it is eﬃcient to use a cost plus contract
even if the component is foreseen (as also observed by Bajari and Tadelis (2001)). Here we have
supposed that the costs are easily observable, and agreed upon by both parties.
Given that the seller is on site, then as we have discussed above, it is likely to be more eﬃcient for
this seller to supply the new component than an outside seller. In this case the incumbent seller may
use the threat of a delay in production to secure a better price. To ensure that authority remains
with the buyer, article 7.3 of AIA form A201-1997 allows the buyer to use a change order directive.
This contractual instrument clearly establishes an authority relationship between the buyer and
seller by putting into writing what the seller is expected to do. The writing requirement ensures
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that should the dispute be litigated there will be a clear statement of the seller's obligation that the
courts can use to determine whether or not breach of contract has occurred. As long as the changes
are within the scope of the project, the seller has an obligation to complete the requested changes
or be in breach of contract.
This removes the ability of the seller to threaten with a delay. He must comply with the changes,
or face a penalty. This power is further reinforced by the bonding form A312 that gives the buyer
the right to seize all equipment and material on the site for the completion of building should the
seller refuse to complete the work.24 The seller is still protected because he may ask the courts for
additional compensation to cover any costs of compliance with the directive. More formally this
contractual instrument is deﬁned as follows:
COD: Change Order Directive:
(1) The buyer requests a new component qu = 1.
(2) The seller produces the component and submits the veriﬁable cost cu.
(3) The buyer or the courts adjust the contract price P upwards by cu.
In the case of Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, had Kent discovered the pipe substitution at the time
it occurred, then he could have asked for immediate action. In that case, given that the cost of
compliance would have been relatively low, Jacob & Youngs would have been obliged to comply.
More generally, this rule ensures that the buyer is able to obtain the changes she wants in a timely
fashion, which in turn reduces the cost of construction, while still providing the seller with protection.
We now turn to the more diﬃcult case of foreseen components where the contract must provide
appropriate incentives for investment into cost reduction.
3.2.2. Buyer Biased Components. Consider now a component that is foreseen to be part of the
project, and for which there is a chance of a design change. For example, the buyer might wish
to change a paint color, or the location of an outlet. Clause 4.2.8 of A201 gives the right to the
buyer/architect to carry out minor changes at no penalty. We call this contractual instrument
changes within the scope of the project or COS:
COS: Changes within the Scope:
24This conﬁscation is consistent with Oliver Hart's observation that authority also includes control over physical
assets  see Hart (1995) page 58.
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(1) If tc is buyer biased and foreseen, then the buyer may, with no price consequence, select any
qc ∈ {0, 1}as long as the change is both minor and within the scope of the project.
This has two eﬀects. Given the design, the sellers can anticipate this behavior, and thus increase their
bids for projects that have a high probability of design change. This in turn provides an incentive
to the buyer to invest in design. When design is of high quality, then the seller does not expect a
large number of design changes ex post, and he correspondingly makes a greater relationship-speciﬁc
investment into cost reduction. Second, since design changes have no eﬀect on price, the buyer now
selects her preferred change, which is eﬃcient given that the component is buyer biased. Thus we
have:
Proposition 5. If a buyer-biased component is governed by the contractual instrument COS, then
the seller chooses eﬀort e at the eﬃcient level conditional upon design d, and hence the lowest cost
of production conditional upon d is achieved.
Under COS there is no price consequence for the buyer's choice, and therefore, ex post, the buyer
chooses her preferred design. Given that the component is buyer biased, this is also the eﬃcient
choice ex post. The expected payoﬀ of the seller at the time eﬀort is chosen is:
US(e|d) = P − ρ(d) {ρ(e)cL + (1− ρ(e))cH} −
(1− ρ(d))cˆ.
= P + (F (d) + 1) {(F (e) + 1)∆c− cH} /2−
(1− F (d))cˆ/2.





hence under COS the seller will choose eﬀort that maximizes social surplus. This result, combined
with the fact that the buyer is a residual claimant implies that design is chosen at the eﬃcient level
whenever COS is included in contract k for buyer biased components.
Note that this contract clause is quite diﬀerent from the ﬁxed price contract typically studied in
the literature, as in Hart and Moore (1988). The typical assumption is that the contract speciﬁes
both price and quantity, with changes in either corresponding to contract breach. This clause is
equivalent to allowing the buyer to make a unilateral change in the quantity, and face no penalty.
As long as the seller can anticipate the likelihood of this change, then allowing changes within the
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scope of the project ensures eﬃcient investment into cost reduction. If one enforced the contract
at the speciﬁed quantity, then under expectations damages the buyer would have to compensate
the seller for any cost consequence. This would result in over-investment, as Rogerson (1984) has
shown.
Thus the AIA's inclusion of a term that allows minor changes to design at no cost is not merely a
convenience that reduces the costs of renegotiation, it also induces eﬃcient eﬀort into cost reduction
and design. A testable implication of this proposition is that one would expect, conditional upon
job characteristics, bids for home improvement projects done without the aid of an architect will be
higher than those with an architect, since they are likely to need more changes ex post.
3.2.3. Seller Biased Components. Consider now the case of a seller biased component with the
feature that it is always optimal to carry out the less expensive design. This would be a feature of
components that do not impinge upon the aesthetic qualities of the ﬁnal project. For example, the
design might call for pipes to be in a particular location behind a wall - yet it may be less expensive
to deviate from the plan. In addition, the contract might not specify exactly how the project would
be executed, even though the buyer may care about this.
In these cases it is eﬃcient to deviate from the default rule that gives the buyer overall control
of the project. The AIA form contracts address this issue in section 3 of A201-1997. This section
outlines the responsibilities of the seller/contractor, with clause 3.3.1 stating that:
The Contractor shall be solely responsible for and have control over construction
means, methods, techniques and procedures and for coordinating all portions of
the Work under the Contract, unless the Contract Documents give other speciﬁc
instructions concerning these matters.
Thus, the buyer does not have the right to directly control the employees of the contractor, and
hence the construction relationship is not a form of employment relationship. Furthermore, under
section 5 of A201-1997 the seller has the right to hire subcontractors subject to approval by the
owner. More generally, the seller has broad control over how to perform the work in the most
eﬃcient way possible:
SCR: Seller Control Rights - the seller may change the design or execution of components
that have no impact upon buyer welfare (∆u = 0).
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This contract clause is eﬃcient for seller biased components for which no design is optimal. A
necessary condition for this to be the case is that
(9) F ′(0) ≤ 2
uu+ F (e0)∆u
,
where e0is the eﬃcient level of eﬀort by the seller when there is no design. It is uniquely deﬁned
by F ′(e0) = 2/∆c if it is strictly positive, otherwise it is zero. If condition (9) is not satisﬁed, then
the buyer will choose d > 0. If e0 > 0, then the optimal eﬀort given d > 0 now depends upon ∆u.
In that case, giving the seller control rights in the absence of a countervailing adjustment to the
contract price is not eﬃcient. These observations are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6. The contractual instrument SCR induces the eﬃcient implementation of a seller
biased component if (9) is satisﬁed. In that case it is eﬃcient for the buyer to engage in no design
(d∗ = 0) and the seller chooses the eﬃcient level of investment e∗ = e0. Conversely, when e0,∆u >
0, this condition is also necessary for SCR to be eﬃcient.
Consider now the case of seller biased components where the gain from design satisﬁes:
(10) ∆c ≥ ∆u > ∆¯u = (2/m− uu) /F (e0),
The ﬁnal equality follows from (9). In this case, it is still eﬃcient to give seller the control over
ex post design, however the seller should also internalize the cost to the buyer from such a change.
This can be achieved if the price is adjusted to reﬂect the loss to the buyer. A common example
of this problem is a minor defect, that might be expensive to correct but has little consequence for
the overall project.
Such defects are eﬀectively choices by the seller (even if inadvertent) that depend upon how
closely employees are monitored. If the defect is major, then under section 12 of A201-1997, the
seller is expected to correct it at his own cost. However, section 12.3 explicitly allows the buyer to
accept non-conforming work combined with a reduction in the contract price. If parties cannot agree
upon a price reduction, then courts would set the reduction equal to its best estimate of the loss
in value to the buyer. Formally, article 12.3 of A201-1997 corresponds to the following contractual
instrument:
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BRR: Buyer remediation rights - if the seller alters the design, then the buyer should be
compensated by an amount equal to the loss in anticipated use value.
The open issue is exactly how one should determine the anticipated use value. Suppose that when
the seller decides to set q = 0, a penalty of l is paid to the buyer. In that case the expected utility
of the seller is:
US(d, e) = P − ρ(d) {ρ(e)cL + (1− ρ(e))(cˆ+ l)}
− (1− ρ(d)) {ρ(e)cL + (1− ρ(e))(cˆ+ l)} − e.
From this expression we can derive the seller's ﬁrst order condition for eﬀort under the hypothesis
that the buyer has chosen design eﬃciently:




Comparing (7) with (11) it follows that the seller will choose eﬃcient investment if l = F (d∗)∆u.
Thus we have the following proposition.
Proposition 7. If ∆c ≥ ∆u > ∆¯u then the contractual instrument BRR induces the eﬃcient
implementation of a component when the damages, l, for a design change by the seller are equal to
the harm to the buyer, ∆u, times the foreseeability of the design, F (d∗).
We have assumed throughout that the preferences of the buyer are not observed by the seller, nor
by the courts. Hence, in order to achieve an eﬃcient allocation that buyer would have to specify in
advance the damages to be paid. If these are not speciﬁed in advance, then we are in a situation
where the courts may be asked to set the appropriate damages. In section 4 we show that this rule
implies a number of existing common law damage rules.
3.3. Summary. A complex project is in practice built up from a large number of specialized com-
ponents that contribute in diﬀerent ways to the overall value of the project. We have shown that it
is optimal to tailor contract terms, including the allocation of control rights, to the characteristics
of the components in a project. Each of these clauses are contractual instruments that together
ensure the eﬃcient implementation of a complex project. We have shown that each contractual
instrument has an analogue in the American Institute of Architects form construction contracts.
The contractual instruments we have discussed are summarized in the following table:
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Table 1. Contractual Instruments
Contractual Instrument Period Enforced Goal
A310 - Bid Bond ex ante Ensure seller does not renege on winning bid.
A312 - Payment Bond ex post Ensure sub-contractors are paid.
A312 - Performance Bond ex post Ensure project is completed if seller cannot perform.
A210-7.2 - Change Order interim Ensure that seller makes requested changes at cost.
A210-7.3 - Construction Change Directive interim Obliges seller to make change.
A210-7.4 - Minor Changes interim Minor modiﬁcations create no change in price.
A210-3.3.1 - Seller Control interim Seller has right to organize production.
A210-12.3 - Remediation ex post Buyer can accept price reduction for non-conforming design.
For the most part these clauses have clear meanings, and hence whether or not there has been
a breach of contract is clear. In some cases, particularly in the case of the remediation clause
(A210-12.3), parties may not agree regarding whether there has been breach, and if so what are the
remedies. We address these issues in the next section.
4. Ex Post: Remedies for Contract Breach
In contrast to what is typically assumed in economics, the fact that parties have entered into
an agreement with clear and veriﬁable terms does not imply that the contract is enforceable.25
This can only be determined by an actual court case. The American Institute of Architects has
published a compendium of courts cases involving contract disputes (see Stein (2001)). From these
one can learn whether or not particular contract clauses would be enforced as agreed upon. Court
cases can also clarify the meaning of text when it can have several interpretations. The AIA form
construction contracts are carefully constructed to take into account these legal decisions, and are
modiﬁed regularly in light of legal developments.
In this section we discuss some actual cases to illustrate how contracts are enforced in practice.
We show that the optimal remediation rule, l = F (d) × ∆u, can be viewed as a default rule that
encompasses a number of well known legal doctrines. We consider in turn the enforcement of
the authority relationship, the choice between speciﬁc performance and expectations damages, and
ﬁnally, rules that limit legal liability.
25The enforceability problem is not limited to construction contracts. For example, the courts won't enforce a contract
in which a patient, prior to receiving treatment, agrees not to sue a health care provider for medical malpractice that
may occur during the treatment. See Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Ca., 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963).
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4.1. Authority. The authority provided by change orders and change directives in AIA form con-
tracts is very diﬀerent from the standard assumption one makes in contract theory. To see this,
suppose that a buyer and seller have agreed upon a contract to exchange q0 units of a good at a
price P 0. Further suppose that this requires signiﬁcant relationship speciﬁc investment by the buyer
(for example, the buyer might be a utility, who has built a train line to the mine supplying coal).
Now suppose that the buyer would like to increase the amount purchased. Models that allow for
renegotiation, such as Hart and Moore (1988) or Aghion et al. (1994), suppose the contract (q0, P 0)
acts as a default for negotiation, with the buyer and seller sharing any rents that arise from contract
renegotiation.
Most importantly, under this contract the seller would have the right to refuse to increase supply.
The authority relationship in the AIA form contract gives the right to the buyer to unilaterally
change the quantity speciﬁed, say to q1. Moreover, the cost of this must be equal to the seller's
marginal cost of increasing supply. So, in practice, for supply contracts one typically has clauses
that allow for changes in the quantity given that this is a very common event. The diﬃculty in
the case of construction is that one cannot always anticipate whether the design will be changed.
Change orders and change directives address this by providing the buyer with the unilateral right
to change the design at cost. This right was aﬃrmed in Karz v. Department of Professional and
Vocational Standards (1936), 11 CA 2d 554, in which the owner and the contractor did not agree
on the price for the extra work but the contractor was required to perform the extra work or be
considered in breach of contract. Speciﬁcally the judge in this case ruled:
Where a contractor refuses to complete a building when the owners thereof refuse
to pay for extras as they orally agreed, and the oral contract for extras is an
independent covenant that does not go to the whole consideration of the written
contract for the erection of the building, but is subordinate and incidental to its
main purpose, the breach by the owners of said oral contract does not constitute a
breach of the entire contract, and does not warrant a rescission of the entire contract
by the contractor, whose only remedy for the breach is compensation in damages.
As we show above, the allocation of authority to the buyer is eﬃcient because it provides ﬁrst best
incentives to the buyer to reveal her true preferences. This right is not a general right that applies
to all buyers, however. For example, the lead contractor is often responsible for the hiring and
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supervision of subcontractors. Moreover, these subcontractors may be asked to carry out additional
work under a change directive. As a matter of law, the subcontractor is not obliged to carry out
the work in the absence of an agreement regarding payment.
In Framingham Heavy Equipment v. Callahan & Sons (2004), 61 Mass. App.Ct. 171, 807
N.E.2d 851, the subcontractor, Framingham Heavy Equipment, refused to complete work on a school
building until they had received payment for extra work carried out under a change directive. In
this case the courts ruled that in refusing to complete the work due to non-payment they had not
breached the contract, and that in fact Callahan & Sons had breached by not making installment
payments for the work as it proceeded. This case illustrates that buyer has authority over the
contractor, but not over subcontractors. This is consistent with the subcontractors making few
relationship speciﬁc investments, and being called in on the job as needed.
These cases illustrate that the courts do enforce agreements, and moreover, the authority rela-
tionship that exists between the buyer and lead contractor on a construction project is enforceable.
We now move on to those cases where the courts appear to be less deferential to the text of the
contract.
4.2. Speciﬁc Performance versus Expectation Damages. The allocation of authority allows
one party to make decisions during the execution of the project that have the force of law, and
hence in most situations are respected by the other party. In practice, if there is a disagreement
and a case is litigated it arrives in court long after the project has been completed or abandoned.
In that case, the question before the courts is not the enforcement of the contract per se, but the
determination of damages. The standard rule is expectations damages, namely compensating the
harmed party for the losses that occurred as a result of the contract breach.
A very controversial question is whether or not the courts should use the rule of speciﬁc perfor-
mance as a measure of damages.26 By this one means providing the harmed party with suﬃcient
funds that they can in fact have the contract terms executed. Most economic models of contract,
implicitly or explicitly suppose, as in Aghion et al. (1994), that the courts use speciﬁc performance.
In this section we discuss two famous cases where it would seem that speciﬁc performance is the
natural remedy, but the courts awarded much smaller expectations damages. These decisions are
very controversial because they are interpreted as undermining the ability of parties to write binding
26See Schwartz (1979) for example.
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contracts. We shall show that in the context of our model of the procurement of a complex good
these decisions are consistent with eﬃcient procurement.
The ﬁrst case is Jacob & Youngs Inc. v. George E. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239 (1921) that was discussed
in the introduction. At issue was whether or not the contractor breached a construction contract by
not installing the agreed upon brand of water pipe, and thereby releasing Kent from the obligation
to make the ﬁnal payment upon the house.
The lower court ruled in favor of Kent, and disallowed evidence regarding the quality of the
installed pipes. Upon appeal, Justice Cardozo ruled that Jacob & Youngs had indeed breached
the contract, but that the damage was negligible, and hence Kent was obliged to make the ﬁnal
payment to Jacob & Youngs. The decision was controversial, with one judge dissenting, because it
would seem to imply that the courts are unwilling to enforce clear contract terms.
In the context of our model, the decision is consistent with eﬃcient contract enforcement. First,
in terms of damages, if the contractor carries out non-conforming work then the optimal rule is to
set damages equal to F (d)∆u. In this case design is foreseeable, and hence F (d) = 1. Given that
the pipes called for in the design were equivalent in quality to the pipes installed, then ∆u = 0, so
that damages should be nominal, as in the ruling by Cardozo.
There is an additional reason why this ruling is eﬃcient that relates to the division of authority
between the buyer and seller. From the court documents it is clear that one reason Kent did not make
the ﬁnal payment was the result of a general dissatisfaction with the work of Jacobs & Youngs.27
The project was not completed on time, and there were some minor details that needed correction
after the completion of construction. Thus, in essence Kent use the technical requirement that the
pipes be of the Reading brand to justify the non-payment. Given that Kent was not substantially
harmed by the change of pipe brands, and did not plan to change the pipes, the non-payment could
be viewed as opportunistic behavior in the sense of Williamson (1975).
One can view the SCR, or seller control rights contractual instrument as solution to opportunistic
behavior on the part of the buyer. It will often be the case that during production a seller may take
shortcuts, either inadvertent or consciously, that lower costs in a way that have a minimal impact
upon buyer welfare. In cases such as Jacobs & Youngs v. Kent, the buyer may attempt to use the
existence of a technical breach of contract to extract rents out of proportion with the harm. If the
27See the discussion in Danzig (1978), page 120.
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courts were to support such behavior then it would lead to higher costs ex ante, and less eﬃcient
contracts. Hence, the decision in Jacobs & Youngs v. Kent is not only the correct decision in the
context of our model of procurement, it is consistent with eﬃcient procurement.
However, there are cases where the non-enforcement of speciﬁc performance seems very prob-
lematic. A good example is the well known case of Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal, 382 P.2d 109,
114 (Okla.1962), also mentioned in the introduction. In this case, the Peevyhouses were a farming
couple who entered an agreement with Garland Coal Co. to allow strip mining upon their land. As
a condition of the contract, the Peevyhouses insisted that the land be regraded upon completion of
the mining operations. The coal company breached this term in the contract, with the consequence
that the Peevyhouses sued them for an amount of $25,000, though the estimated cost of remediation
was about $29,000.
It is worthwhile observing that the Peevyhouses crossed out a term in the agreement that would
have allowed Garland not to grade the land in exchange for damages of $5,000.28 Hence, the
agreement clearly stated that Garland had an obligation to repair the land. As in Jacob & Youngs
v. Kent, the issue was not whether there had been a breach of contract, but what the appropriate
damages should be. The lower court awarded $5,000 rather than the $25,000. Upon appeal, it was
found that the reduction in value of the land from not grading was $300, and hence the damages
were reduced from $5,000 to $300!
The case was very controversial because the courts refused to enforce a clear contract condition.
As Maute (1995) discusses, there was also a hint of impropriety because there appeared to be a
relationship between one of the judges and the law ﬁrm representing Garland Coal. With regards to
this latter point, it highlights the fact that when parties write a contract they must do so given the
behavior of the courts in their jurisdictions, and not based upon an idealized court.29 The question
then is whether or not the Peevyhouses could have written an enforceable contract given that the
court uses expectations as a measure of damages, and also might be swayed by a tint of favoritism?
The AIA forms, speciﬁcally A312, provide a solution via the performance bond. It is a common
requirement that sellers post a bond. This bond ensures that should the seller default, then the
bonding company or surety will step in and hire another supplier if necessary. It is worth empha-
sizing that the role of the surety is quite diﬀerent from that of the courts. The court merely awards
28See Maute (1995).
29See Djankov et al. (2003) for some evidence on how courts operate in practice.
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damages based upon a measure of expectations, while the surety completes the construction of the
project. This is possible because the surety is a company that specializes in the provision of such
services, and hence is able to supervise the completion of a construction process.
Should the surety not perform, given that the ﬁnancial liability is clearly speciﬁed, the applica-
tion of expectation damages is straightforward, and will always equal the cost of completion (i.e.,
speciﬁc performance). This demonstrates that in practice the fact that courts limit themselves to
expectations damages does not imply that parties cannot enforce performance. The issue is that the
enforcement of speciﬁc performance is a complex task, entailing the use of the various contractual
instruments we have discussed above.
In the case of Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal Co., if the contract had included a bonding provision,
then grading, up to the limits of the bond, would have been enforceable. It is also the case that
while it is option for the buyer to accept a price reduction in lieu of performance, this can only occur
if agreed upon by the seller or the surety. The courts would be obliged to award the buyer damages
equal to the value of performance only in the case that the surety defaults upon its obligation,
otherwise the default is to have the work completed by the surety.
If Kent, in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, wished to have Reading pipe for reasons other than the
transport of water, then the contract should have included explicit liquidated damages in the case
of non-performance. Given that the courts in the US will not enforce liquidated damages that are
deemed unreasonable, the buyer would also have to explain why the brand of pipe is so important.
In that case, if the seller were to default and install a diﬀerent brand, the courts again need only
apply the rule of expectations damages, and use the liquidated damage clause as the basis of the
award. Thus, these damages can play a useful role by providing information to the seller regarding
the buyer's preferences ex ante. The seller is then clearly aware of the consequences of any decision
to breach the contract.
4.3. Unforeseeable Events, Mistakes and Impossibility. There are a number of legal default
rules that deal with events that are unforeseen at the time a contract is agreed upon. The ﬁrst of
these limits liability to damages that are foreseen, as established in the the famous case of Hadley
v. Baxendale (1854), 9 Exch 341.
In Hadley v. Baxendale, the court ruled that liability should be limited to losses arising according
to the usual course of things or losses that have been in contemplation of both parties, at the time
32
they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. The Hadley brothers, owners of
City Flour Mills, wanted a broken shaft to be shipped by Pickford & Company, a common carrier, of
which Baxendale was the managing director. The shaft was to be sent to Joyce & Co., Greenwich,
manufacturers of the mill's steam engine. The broken shaft was supposed to be a model for a new
shaft without which the mill could not operate. The shaft, which was supposed to be delivered by
May 15, 1854, was not delivered until May 21. Baxendale was not informed about the high value
of the product to Hadley, and therefore Baxendale did not take special precaution to ensure an
on-time delivery. Hadley then sued Baxendale for the lost proﬁts due to the delivery delay.
The court held that Baxendale was not liable for Hadley's lost proﬁts since the loss was due to
unusual circumstances, and that the damages to Hadley were unforeseen by Baxendale. In this
case, it was agreed that the damages due to the late delivery, ∆u = u11 − u01, were large, possibly
larger than the cost of taking action to avoid late delivery. However, these losses were unforeseen
by Baxendale. In the context of our liability rule, this is modeled explicitly by the degree of
foreseeability, F (d). Formally, an event is unforeseen if F (d) = 0, and hence the damages due are
l = F (d∗)∆u = 0.30
This result generalizes the analysis of Ayres and Gertner (1989) and Bebchuk and Shavell (1991).
They observe that the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale provides incentives to buyers to reveal informa-
tion regarding the value of a service, which in turn induces sellers to take appropriate precautions.
In our model, the degree of planning is fully endogenous, and allows for partial foreseeability.
This damage formula is also consistent with the legal rule that limits liability in the event of a
mistake. If an error in the contract leads to faulty performance or if the contracting parties have
diﬀering understandings of the transaction, then non-performance may be excused. An example
of this rule is the case of Mannix v. Tryon (1907), 152 C 31, in which the court found that the
decolorization of the building arose due to the speciﬁcations in the contract about the method used
to mix plaster. The contractor was not held liable for the defect. Similarly in McConnell v. Corona
City Water Co. (1906), 149 C 60, the contractor was excused for the collapse of the tunnel since
the contractor had followed the drawings, which were defective. In each of these cases, the harm
30We model unforeseeability as there being an equal chance of one of two events occurring. This idea generalizes to
more events, and simply captures the idea that the seller will not invest in lowering costs if he does not know which
of several possible actions is the most eﬃcient action.
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was signiﬁcant, but the design was inadequate, corresponding to F (d) = 0, and hence no liability
for the seller.
5. Discussion
The economics of contract theory is concerned with explaining the structure of a contract given
the constraints imposed by transactions costs. Despite the many recent advances, Tirole (1999) has
observed that there remains a signiﬁcant gap between the theory and the evidence. One reason for
this gap is that economic models of contract typically assume the courts enforce performance that
is clearly speciﬁed in a contract. Under this rule, Chung (1991) and, Aghion et al. (1994) provide
general conditions under which the ﬁrst best can be achieved.
Given that the courts have only the power to impose monetary penalties, speciﬁc performance
as used in these models implies that the courts must be willing to use suﬃciently high penalties
that deter the seller from contract breach.31 In practice, the common law rule in both America and
the United Kingdom is expectations damages. This corresponds to the court's monetary estimate
of the loss suﬀered by the harmed party. In many cases the use of this rule results in damages far
below the level necessary to enforce speciﬁc performance. This leaves open the question of whether
or not it is possible to design an eﬃcient contract given the rule of expectations damages.
More generally, the lesson of mechanism design theory, as developed Maskin (1999) and Myerson
(1979), is that feasible resource allocation mechanisms are constrained by the information available
to parties. Similarly, rational parties who wish to write an enforceable agreement would also take
into account the constraints imposed by the legal system of the jurisdiction responsible for enforcing
the contract. Hence, a theory of observed contract form must incorporate not only the constraints
arising from transactions cost, such as asymmetric information and hold-up, but also limits upon
the set of legally enforceable contracts.
In this paper we introduce a model of complex exchange and show that it is possible to write
a contract that is eﬃcient and enforceable under the rule of expectation damages. The optimal
contract consists of a collection of contractual instruments - speciﬁc clauses that apply at diﬀerent
stages of the project, and for diﬀerent contingent events. We show that each of these instruments
have analogues in the the American Institute of Architects (AIA) form construction contracts. This
31The one exception to this general rule is the title to an idiosyncratic good, such as a work of art. Given that market
alternatives are not readily available, the courts may enforce contracts that call for the transfer of such a title.
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result is consistent with the hypothesis that these form contracts provide an eﬃcient and legally
enforceable solution to the problem of contracting for the supply of a complex good, such as a large
building project.
The fact that the AIA form contracts have evolved over one hundred years illustrates that con-
tracts are themselves complex products that are subject to innovation and change. Thus, it is not
surprising that parties who write contracts without the beneﬁt of experience or hindsight are likely
to make errors. In these cases, the courts may be called upon to adjudicate disputes involving
these poorly crafted agreements. Our model is consistent with the hypothesis that the courts in the
United States (and in some case the United Kingdom) have evolved eﬃcient default rules in these
cases.32 Speciﬁcally, the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale limiting damages to those that are foreseen,
the doctrines of impossibility and mistake that excuse the breaching party from performance are
optimal within the context of our model.
Of course, this analysis is only a starting point for a fuller investigation into how the law can
shape the form of observed contracts. As Djankov et al. (2003) show, there is enormous variation
across countries in the way courts adjudicate contract disputes. It is likely the case that some legal
systems are more eﬃcient than others, but such a statement is extremely diﬃcult to evaluate in
practice given the wide disparity in local conditions. Thus, while we have shown that the AIA
form construction contracts in the US can be viewed as an eﬃcient solution to the problem of
implementing complex trade, it is not clear if these forms would be eﬃcient in other jurisdictions,
especially in cases where, as discussed in Johnson et al. (2002), parties have increased reliance upon
informal enforcement.33We need a great deal of further work in order to understand the complex
interplay between contract form, transactions costs, and the limits of legal enforcement.
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